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Abstract: 
From 1993 to 2002 the emergence of the urban resident 
Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) system saw a major 
reconfiguration and expansion of social assistance in the 
People's Republic of China. 
 
The development of the MLG has been a complex process. 
The initial emergence and design of the MLG reflects space in 
the Chinese state for innovations and feedback in the social 
assistance agenda. The expansion and development of the 
MLG can be explained by the interventions of key policy 
actors. These actors pushed the MLG for a variety of different 
reasons. The resources available to these actors and the 
outcomes of their interventions were a reflection of their 
institutional position in the bureaucracy. 
 
Contributing to existing studies of Chinese social policy 
reform this article argues that the emergence, design, and 
development of the policy reflects institutional space, 
constraints, and feedback in the Chinese policy process. 
 
Keywords: 
China, social assistance, policy, institution, Minimum 
Livelihood Guarantee 
 
 
Introduction 
The twin processes of reform and opening up have brought unprecedented wealth to the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and improved the lives of millions of people. However, 
China's economic growth has not been without consequence and increasing urban poverty has 
been one outcome of reforming China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and planned economy. 
In the last twenty years the Chinese government has begun to develop policy responses to 
increasing urban poverty. The urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee system (zuidi 
shenghuo baozhang, MLG or dibao hereafter) was one policy response which the Chinese 
government introduced in an effort to provide for and placate the part of the urban population 
which has not benefited from the reform process. Between 1993 and 2002 the MLG grew 
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from a policy innovation introduced in the city of Shanghai affecting a few thousand 
individuals to a national policy providing benefits to over twenty million people. The MLG is 
a means tested benefit which tops up household income to a locally set level. The policy, as 
set out in the 1999 MLG regulations (State-Council, 1999), is funded, administered and 
adjusted by the local level of government. When compared to the preceding social assistance 
framework, the Three Nos (sanwu), which paid benefits to those who fell into three specific 
categories (no career, no parent, no work ability) the MLG can be seen as a radical departure 
from the preceding policy. 
 
Despite the rapid development from local innovation to national implementation of a radically 
new method of delivering social assistance to urban residents, little policy analysis has been 
done on the MLG which has sought to explain the emergence and development of the policy. 
This is understandable given that the majority of the studies on the MLG come from an 
economic, sociological or social work background. The concern of the authors is not to 
discuss theories of policy making or the origins of the MLG in particular. Descriptive studies 
of the MLG set out the policy and sometimes give an historical review (Leung, 2003, 2006; 
Leung & Wong, 1999; Saunders & Shang, 2001; Wong & Flynn, 2001; Wong, 1998, 2001). 
These studies have a tendency, because they focus on the efficacy of the MLG, to skirt round 
explanations of the program’s development. For example Leung (2003: 83) writes: 
“To establish a last-resort welfare safety net in the cities, the government 
restructured the traditional social assistance program in 1993, with the aim of 
extending their coverage, raising the level of benefits and securing financial 
commitments from the local governments.” 
The implicit suggestion is that the MLG followed a straightforward development from local 
initiative to national implementation. This does, however, present the MLG’s development as 
being a simple process which it was not. Rather than focusing on the scope and effectiveness 
of the MLG this article seeks to explore and offer an explanation for the emergence and 
development of the program.  
 
There is also work which uses the MLG as a tool that helps measure the difficult question of 
what constitutes poverty in the People’s Republic (ADB, 2004; Saunders & Sun, 2006). Other 
studies discuss the MLG as part of the overall social policy provisions of the Chinese state. 
Hussain discusses the MLG in terms of its design and potential effectiveness in alleviating 
poverty (Hussain, 2003). Solinger discusses the policy as part of an emerging hierarchy of the 
unemployed in China (Solinger, 2001). The work of Liu and Wu, Qian and Wong, Wong and 
Ngok also discuss the MLG within the context of various measures introduced by the state to 
cope with increasing urban poverty and unemployment (Liu & Wu, 2006; Qian & Wong, 
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2000; Wong & Ngok, 2006).  Finally in his recent work on the provision of social goods in 
China, Saich discusses the MLG as part of move toward a standard centralized provision of 
social assistance (Saich, 2008).  
 
Although studies of the MLG have focused almost exclusively on the operation and 
effectiveness of the policy there have been exhaustive policy studies focusing on other areas 
of China’s social security and welfare system.  Studies of China’s efforts to reform its pension, 
health and emerging unemployment provisions provide a number of themes which help 
explain policy developments in the PRC. Reviewing reform of China’s social provisions, Gu 
notes the importance of institutions as an explanatory tool. Gu argues that the problem of 
providing social goods in 1990s China was a result of previous efforts at reforming the state-
owned sector. These reforms undermined the basis of social provisions whilst failing to 
provide working alternatives (Gu, 2001). On pensions both Béland and Yu (2004) and Frazier 
(2004) note the impact that different interests can have on policy outcomes. They note in 
particular that decisions on policy can feed back in the formation of new interests which can 
impede future policy development and implementation. Duckett (2001, 2003) also highlights 
the significant role that can be played by established interests in the reform of healthcare 
provision in the PRC. Béland and Yu, Frazier and Duckett also address the significant impact 
which the fragmented Chinese state has on social policy in the PRC, providing space for 
innovations, competing bureaucratic interests, and the challenge of overcoming local 
government intransigence and misinterpretation of policy (Béland & Yu, 2004; Duckett, 2001, 
2003; Frazier, 2004a, 2004b). Finally, Solinger (2005) uses feedback in explaining challenges 
facing China’s efforts at dealing with unemployment. Solinger argues that local government 
actors reverted to previous patterns of administration and prioritizing who to provide for when 
implementing new measures for newly unemployed workers which does include a brief 
discussion of the MLG (Solinger, 2005). The explanation of the MLG presented here 
contributes to this existing body of policy analysis.  
 
This article will complement these studies of social provision in China by arguing that the 
MLG can be explained through combining concepts regarding the influence of state 
institutions and policy feedback with our existing understanding of the influence of 
bureaucratic policy actors in the PRC. The structure of the Chinese state and the complex 
relationships between different branches of government and different levels of government 
affected the MLG in two ways. First, state institutions created the space for local level 
innovation to occur and were therefore a positive influence. Second, conversely, this space 
also presented challenges to the spread and effective implementation of the MLG. This 
reflects known features of the Chinese policy process as developed in the work of Lampton, 
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and Lieberthal and Oksenberg for example (Lampton, 1987, 1992; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 
1988; Lieberthal, 1992). Policy feedback is the other area of influence where previous policy 
decisions constrain the available choices for policy actors and sponsors. Policy feedback is 
understood here as the constraining of policy choices available as a result of previous policy 
decisions made (Béland & Yu, 2004; Pierson, 1994, 2004; Skocpol, 1992). Feedback does not 
rule out possibilities but it does make certain choices more difficult to make because 
alternatives become increasingly politically or financially expensive for policy makers.  
 
The role of policy actors is explained through the lens of the rational bureaucrat. This is best 
developed in Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s fragmented authoritarianism model in which they 
argue that policy development and outcomes reflect the decisions made by these bureaucratic 
actors who are motivated by rational policy concerns and the desire to build their own 
organizations up (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). The position occupied by particular actors 
is an important factor implicit in Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s ideas. In the case of the MLG, 
there have been three policy actors, Minister Duoji Cairang and Premiers Li Peng and Zhu 
Rongji, who at different stages from 1993 to 2002 brought their influence to bear on the 
policy and profoundly affected its development. In each case the institutional position 
occupied by the policy actor influenced the outcomes. 
 
The findings presented in this article are based on analysis of Chinese-language government 
and academic documents and interviews conducted in the PRC during 2006 and 2007.  Four 
questions will be raised which address the MLG: why did the MLG emerge in Shanghai? 
What explains the design of the MLG? What explains the reason and pattern of the local to 
national transition between 1994 and 1997? Finally, what explains the significant expansion 
and changes of funding for the MLG after 2000? A final section addresses the role played by 
local government. Instead of focusing on the effectiveness of the MLG this article will 
provide explanations to these questions by using a combination of the institutional position of 
policy actors, decentralized state institutions and policy feedback. 
 
When addressing the emergence of the MLG in Shanghai, the space provided by the Chinese 
state’s decentralization of authority was the main factor. Decentralization had both benefitted 
the city as it pushed ahead with reform and it also created the problem of growing urban 
poverty. In dealing with increasing poverty Shanghai took advantage of the space 
decentralization decision making authority and its own fiscal strength to implement the MLG. 
There are two conflicting elements as the Shanghai model, as it came to be known, was both a 
radical policy change but included continuities from the previous system. The changes reflect 
the pragmatic approach to policy making idealized by the Deng regime at work coupled with 
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the intervention of then Mayor Huang Ju. However, continuities persisted demonstrating the 
influence of feedback from the traditional Three Nos system. National implementation in 
1997 and the subsequent expansion of the MLG are both due to the intervention of particular 
policy actors in the policy process. The institutional position matters a great deal because the 
political, fiscal and personnel resources available to an actor have a profound impact not only 
on the decisions made but also the outcomes.  
 
The MLG from 1993 to 2002 
 
The MLG is a means tested social assistance policy which provides impoverished urban 
residents with a supplement to their income
3
. The provisions are based on the MLG line 
(dibao xian), which is calculated locally, with residents applying to their local sub-district 
(shequ) for the benefit. Residents need to demonstrate that their total household income falls 
below the MLG line. In order to do this during the application process their intention to 
receive the MLG is made public and their household as well as income is investigated. 
Provided the applicants demonstrate their income is below the MLG line they are then paid a 
benefit which brings their income up to the MLG line (State-Council, 1997, 1999). For 
example, if the MLG line is set at 150 RMB per person per month and a household of 4 
applies for the benefit then the total household income needs to fall below 600 RMB per 
month. If successful, the benefit provided will bring the household income up to this level. 
The intention of the MLG is to provide a minimum subsistence provision to the most 
impoverished in China's cities and is set intentionally low at around a third of the minimum 
wage and two thirds the level of unemployment insurance payouts (Saich, 2008). In order to 
adequately cope with local variations in economic development, the setting of a city's initial 
MLG line and any subsequent adjustments to it are decided by the local government. This 
means that the MLG varies in level substantially across China, in theory reflecting the varying 
cost of living that varied economic development across the PRC has brought. 
 
The MLG first emerged in the city of Shanghai in June 1993 following a year of internal 
deliberation between the Bureau of Civil Affairs, Labor, Finance, the Trade Unions and a 
number of other government organizations under the guidance of Mayor Huang Ju. The 
policy was launched in tandem with a minimum wage system, ensuring social stability by 
providing for those excluded from traditional social assistance (referred to as san bu guan or 
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literally three non-managed by Shanghai officials).. The initial MLG in Shanghai was based 
on a mixed system of local government and enterprise funding and administration. The policy 
was initially small in scale affecting 7680 recipients in 1993 and providing an MLG line of 
120 RMB (Shanghai-BCA, 1997). This early version of the MLG was funded locally through 
the levying of welfare fees (fuli fei), which were to be paid by enterprises using their own 
funds (ziyou zijin) (Shanghai-RenminZhengfu, 1996). The MLG marked a significant change 
in the provision of social assistance in China at this time because it moved away from the 
centrally funded, inflexible, category based system of the traditional Three Nos (sanwu) 
system which provided limited subsidies for those with no caregiver, no income and no ability 
to work (Linda Wong, 1998). 
 
In 1994 the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) held its national congress in Beijing; two 
pronouncements on the MLG at this meeting marked the beginning of the move from local 
innovation to national policy. In his work report to the congress, then Minister of Civil Affairs 
Duoji Cairang (Duoji, 1995a) stated that the MCA should “…target urban social assistance 
through the progressive introduction of local minimum livelihood guarantee relief.”  This was 
the first indication by a central level government official that the MLG should be 
implemented in any cities beyond Shanghai. Minister Duoji's statement was supported later in 
the congress during then Premier Li Peng's speech which emphasized the need for reform in 
the social assistance system (P. Li, 1995). After the congress, the MLG began to spread to 
other cities but the spread, as can be seen in Figure 1, was not significant. Where it has been 
possible to discern the geographical spread of the MLG it appears to have initially been 
implemented in the more developed and larger cities. Most of these were in the east of the 
country such as Guangdong, Beijing, Dalian, Wuhan, Qingdao, or Xiamen (Duoji, 1998a). 
Throughout 1995 and into early 1996, the MLG spread slowly supported during the period by 
Minister Duoji in speeches and work meetings. It should be noted that during this period the 
MLG was a policy being pushed by the MCA rather than by the State Council. The central 
government, except for the MCA, did not show any interest in the spread of the MLG. Rather 
Minister Duoji and the MCA pushed for the policy to be carried out encouraging its spread 
through routine work meetings and special meetings on the policy. 
 
Figure 1 – Total Number of Cities Implementing the MLG 1993 – 1997. 
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Source: Collated by author (Duoji, 1998a, 1998b; W. Li, 2002).  
 
As intimated in Figure 1 1996 and 1997 saw an upswing in the number of cities carrying out 
the MLG. This corresponded with three important legislative events and Li Peng becoming a 
more active supporter of the MLG. In 1996 the MLG was written into the Ninth Five Year 
Plan for 1996 – 2000 and also into the 2010 Long Term Development Goals (NPC, 1998). 
Planning by the Chinese state is an important indicator of future policy goals and the MLG's 
inclusion here meant that it had moved from being an objective of just the MCA to an 
objective of the State Council and elite leadership of the PRC. In 1997 the MLG had its first 
official document released in the “State Council circular regarding establishing a national 
urban resident MLG system,” hereafter 1997 Circular (State-Council, 1997). This document 
complemented the previous year’s intention to implement the MLG by providing reasons for 
the policy being implemented, technical details on the design and function of the policy as 
well as a timetable for implementation. It is worth noting here that the 1997 Circular did not 
mention enterprises as a source of funding and instead the MLG was to be funded fully by the 
local government budget. The 1997 Circular was released with publicity from State Council 
members and elevated activity from the MCA including a press conference on the policy and 
meetings within the MCA (Duoji, 1998b; Fan, 1998; B. Li, 1998; G. Li, 1998a, 1998b; Zou, 
1998). 
 
The MLG did not achieve full implementation until 1999 and the publication of the Urban 
Resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Regulations, hereafter MLG Regulations (State-
Council, 1999). The MLG Regulations essentially repeated the core concepts of the MLG and 
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included an explicit clause indicating that full implementation of the MLG should be achieved 
by the end of the year. In November 1999 MCA Vice-Minister Fan Baojun was able to 
announce that the MLG had successfully been implemented in all cities in the People's 
Republic (Fan, 2000). At this point the MLG was operating in 2310 cities across China six 
years after the policy had initially appeared in Shanghai (Duoji, 2001b). 
 
By 1999 the MLG had a clear objective in the provision of a subsistence standard of living for 
urban residents, and a standard administrative and financial basis – following what become 
known as the Dalian model of sub-district (shequ) administration supported by local 
government financing (Duoji, 1998a). The policy saw a number of significant developments. 
As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 the MLG expanded in terms of the numbers receiving the 
MLG and also the amount being spent on the policy. At this point the locally managed MLG 
was becoming increasingly subject to central government interventions. In late 1999 the MLG 
had, under orders from the State Council, been increased by 30% nationwide as part of the 
People's Republic 50
th
 anniversary celebrations (MoF, 2000). From 2000 to 2002 the MCA, 
under the guidance of then Premier Zhu Rongji, ran the “Ought to protect, fully protect” 
(yingbao, jinbao) campaign, which saw some 10 million new MLG recipients gaining the 
benefit supported by corresponding increases in finance for the policy. By 2002 the central 
government had become the main source of funds, as illustrated in Figure 4 in spite of the 
policy ostensibly remaining local in administrative and financial terms. The proportion of 
funding up until 2007 is included to demonstrate that this is indeed a trend and not just an 
aberration brought on by the “Ought to protect, fully protect” campaign.   
 
Figure 2 – Total Number of MLG Recipients 1999 – 2003.  
Source: MCA (2009, 2009a) 
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Figure 3 – Total Spent on MLG 1999 – 2003.  
Source: MCA (2009, 2009a) 
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Figure 4 – Proportion of MLG Financing 1998 – 2007. Source: (MoF, 2005 p 308) 
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By 2002 the MLG had transformed from the local innovation that had appeared in Shanghai 
ten years earlier. The idea that reforming and then expanding social assistance provisions was 
related to dealing with urban poverty for political reasons is not something this article will 
challenge. Rather this article will address the explanatory gap in existing studies of the MLG 
which focus on the effectiveness of the policy. This is a gap worth addressing because the 
MLG is one of the many important social policy developments of the 1990s and deserves to 
be examined in as much detail as pension reform, for example. The emergence and 
development of the MLG is interesting in terms of its origins, its design and how it transferred 
from a local initiative to national implementation. I make four arguments. First, the MLG 
emerged in Shanghai because of the decentralized nature of the state.  Second, the design of 
the MLG came about through feedback from the traditional social assistance system. Third, 
policy actors occupying certain institutional positions explain the reason and pattern of the 
transition of the MLG from local innovation to national policy. Finally, policy actors 
occupying certain institutional positions also explains why the MLG saw such significant 
expansion and change in source of funding after 2000 
 
Why Shanghai? Space in the Decentralized State 
The MLG emerged initially as a local policy innovation which aimed to deal with particular 
concerns within the government of Shanghai. The introduction of the program in Shanghai 
was part of a wider planned revision of social assistance policy. Conventionally, if the central 
government decides that an experimental policy should be implemented in a city it will 
announce that this is the case. In the case of the MLG there is no documentation on the policy 
at central level until 1994. Interviews with Chinese researchers and government officials 
support the idea that the MLG was a local initiative (Interviews BJ06-2, BJ07-3, GrpBJ06-1, 
TJ06-1 and TJ06-4). Understanding the origins of the MLG will better help understand not 
only the development of the MLG but also why local innovations emerge in China.  
 
Reforming the existing social assistance system became part of the Shanghai government 
agenda in the second half of 1992 (Shi, 2002). Concerns coalesced around the combination of 
forthcoming reforms to the textile and steel industries which expected to produce a significant 
surge in unemployed and laid-off workers (Interviews TJ06-1, BJ07-1); rising costs for 
everyday goods in particular foodstuffs (Yang, 2003); the perception that the current social 
assistance system could not cope with China’s developing economy or the growing number of 
poor outside the system (Tang, 1998, 2003); and the fear that enterprise reforms might 
produce social instability similar to that experienced in the north east of China (Interview 
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TJ06-1)(A. P. L. Liu, 1996). Led by Mayor Huang Ju and a committee chaired by the 
Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs (BCA) various policy measures were proposed in reports 
which focused on three groups under no jurisdiction (the san bu guan) which included elderly 
with caregivers but no support, workers with no work unit, and families of workers who had 
died or injured (Shi, 2002). In early 1993 agreement was reached, with Mayor Huang Ju 
apparently playing a significant role (Interviews TJ06-1, BJ07-1), on a two-branch approach 
to potential problems. The MLG was to be implemented in combination with a minimum 
wage system across the city which, together, would address problems faced by workers and 
the retired who fell into each of the three problem groups identified (Shi, 2002; Tang, 2003; 
Yang, 2003).  
 
Shanghai's position in the state hierarchy was a significant factor in contributing to the agenda 
on social assistance and creating the space for innovations in policy to occur. The structure of 
the Chinese state is hierarchical and dominated by rankings. Higher ranking units can 
countermand and issue orders to subordinate units. The highest ranked unit is the State 
Council. Equally ranked units can effectively cancel each other out if disagreements emerge 
because neither out-ranks the other; in these scenarios a higher-ranked unit might be called in 
to act as arbiter (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988).  Shanghai is classified as a zhixiashi rank 
city which literally translates as municipality but has been referred to as a “named city” 
amongst other titles (Lieberthal, 1995), here referred to as municipalities. Currently the cities 
enjoying this rank are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing, all of which are large cities 
in terms of administrative area, population, economic output and political influence. The 
important point is that this ranking places the municipalities on an equal level with the 
provinces and central government ministries when it comes to policy making and 
implementation as well as control over their own budget. The only bodies ranked higher are 
commissions, the Ministry of Finance (in practice if not formally) and finally the State 
Council. This position in the structure of the state means that cities like Shanghai enjoy a 
degree of flexibility when it comes to policy making. 
 
 Shanghai’s position in the state structure manifested itself in the development of the MLG. 
First, Shanghai was one of the more advanced cities in China and was facing the benefits and 
pressures of reform before other areas (Interview BJ06-3). Pressures manifested in increasing 
cost of living for residents, especially in food prices (Yang, 2003), and increasing numbers of 
people falling outside of the traditional social and economic system because reforms of SOEs 
(Interviews TJ06-1 and BJ07-1). Shanghai, however, was also in an advantageous position 
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because it was benefitting from reform. When the MLG was being developed in Shanghai, the 
city was extremely wealthy in comparison to other Chinese cities. The city was averaging 
GDP growth of 12% per year in the early 1990s and generating significant revenues. In 1993 
Shanghai’s annual revenue was 43.9 billion Yuan, roughly double the revenue of 1984. In 
1993, according to the city’s statistics record, Shanghai spent 12.9 billion yuan which is 
substantially less than its revenue but still a significant amount (Shanghai Statistics Bureau, 
2009, November 6). The Chinese Academy of Sciences shows Shanghai spending 14.19 
billion Yuan in 1993 with Beijing and Tianjin, two cities of comparable size and 
administrative rank, spending 863.5 and 536.1 million Yuan respectively in the same year 
which is a significant difference in fiscal strength (CAS, 2010, September 19). According to 
the national statistics office of the Chinese government in 1995 the city continued to generate 
greater revenue and spent more than either Beijing or Tianjin (China Statistics Bureau Online, 
2009). Second, the proactive nature of policy makers in Shanghai suggests that they were able 
to operate in response to perceived problems. One senior Chinese researcher (Interview BJ07-
1) indicated that there was fear in Shanghai of social instability similar to that experienced in 
the northeast China. Liu’s study of protest in China supports this, showing that in 1992 
Shanghai was relatively incident-free whilst the dongbei region suffered a spate of protests 
(Liu, 1996). Third, Shanghai could act with a degree of independence because of its status and 
fiscal strength as a municipality (Interview TJ06-3). Finally, Shanghai could act because it 
had the political status to do as it pleased due to connections between the national and 
Shanghai’s ruling elites, notably Jiang Zemin (Interview HK06-2). 
 
The emergence of the MLG in Shanghai can only in part be explained by the actions of a few 
key policy actors. Whilst the reason for the policy being seen as necessary was ultimately due 
to growing concerns over the political impact urban residents who fell outside of the 
traditional social assistance might have this does not fully explain why the policy emerged in 
Shanghai. Rather, the motivations of these policy actors combined with the favorable 
institutional and fiscal position enjoyed by Shanghai at the time. The position of Shanghai as 
a municipality is an important part of the reason. Shanghai was pressing ahead with reforms 
rapidly; a result of their relative independence in decision-making, and this was raising 
concerns over possible future social unrest due to increasing poverty. This concern combined 
with the relative independence, both in political and fiscal terms, of Shanghai's policy makers 
to set the agenda for policy change. Finally the position that Shanghai occupied meant that 
policy innovations were possible because very few government bodies could countermand 
decisions made in the city. Whilst this might explain why, first, concerns over social 
assistance and, then, the MLG emerged in Shanghai it does not explain why the MLG took 
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the form it did.  
 
The Design of the MLG:  Continuity and change in policy  
The MLG marked a significant departure in the management and delivery of urban social 
assistance. Its early form in Shanghai mixed new ideas for social assistance such as the means 
test, local setting of benefit levels and an adjustment mechanism with more traditional 
concepts such as a role remaining for the work unit and enterprises in funding and 
administering the policy. This version of the MLG became known as the Shanghai model.  
 
Breaking from the traditional path of social assistance can be explained by the role of Mayor 
Huang Ju and the policy process, in part, effectively addressing the problems raised by the 
traditional social assistance system, with elements of both dramatic changes and continuity in 
the Shanghai model, each of which needs to be explained. The traditional Three Nos policy 
set the agenda, ruled out certain policy possibilities as well as set certain requirements for any 
new policy which would replace it, allowing significant change to occur. The traditional 
system of social welfare provision continued to influence the means of delivering policy in 
spite of it being part of the problem. 
 
The Three Nos policy was perceived as the source of a problem for policy actors who needed 
to seek a practical response. At a design level the Three Nos sought to provide for a limited 
group of people who would have fallen out of the work-based provisions established through 
the work unit (danwei). However, as identified in the Shanghai work report presented in early 
1993 (Shi, 2002), the policy was totally inflexible. If a household or individual was outside 
the work unit system and impoverished, but not one of the Three Nos, then they were not 
entitled to relief. Until the late 1980s this was a problem in theory only as the system acted in 
concert with the work-based provisions of the work unit. Only when the reforms of 
enterprises and employment began to deepen in the post-Southern Tour climate of 1992 did 
the issue manifest. At this point there were impoverished groups that the system did not cater 
to; such as the san bu guan identified in Shanghai. The Three Nos was failing to 
accommodate the changing welfare structure at the same time that funding limitations meant 
that it was failing to offer adequate provisions to the groups it did target (Tang, 1998, 2001). 
The Three Nos was a failing policy in the early 1990s because of a combination of changing 
circumstances and a very rigid design. 
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In terms of continuities the MLG does reflect some of the design of the Three Nos. One of the 
features of the MLG is that it includes three categories that are eligible to apply in spite of 
being a means-tested policy: those who fill the traditional Three Nos categories; those who 
are unemployed or receiving pensions with an income below the MLG line; and those 
households with an income below the MLG line (State-Council, 1997, 1999). The targets fit 
with the previous Three Nos categories, which was explained as a necessary requirement 
because the MLG had to account for both the new poor and what could be referred to as the 
old poor as well (Interview BJ07-1). Categories that map on to the Three Nos would not have 
been necessary for the targets to have been included because the means test would have 
captured people covered by the Three Nos. This design choice suggests long standing 
practices in the administration of social assistance working its way, via policy actors making 
design choices, into the design of the new policy. 
 
The legacy of the work unit in local government structure also shows feedback in that it is a 
continuation of older problematic systems, in spite of some significant policy changes. Unlike 
the later iterations of the MLG, the Shanghai model had a role for the work units and their 
enterprises in helping to administer the policy and finance the MLG(Shanghai-
RenminZhengfu, 1996); in the iteration of the MLG which was rolled out nationwide in 1997 
work units were not involved in the policy at all. The decision to use work units was 
explained by a Chinese researcher as being an efficient choice at the time (Interview TJ06-1), 
as the work units were a powerful administrative tool in the early 1990s. At this time work 
units would have been a familiar option for policy makers seeking mechanisms capable of 
providing administrative and financial assistance. The shequ (community or sub-districts) 
which would be used later to administer the MLG were still being established as an informal 
administrative unit. The street and residents committees were also used as part of the overall 
administrative structure for the MLG in concert with the work units. A local initiative would 
have to be funded locally, and the enterprises in Shanghai provided an obvious means to raise 
that revenue. 
 
The interesting, and contradictory, point is that although category-based targets do exist in the 
MLG they are not the means by which benefit entitlement is decided, which is a means test 
based on the total household income. The means test in theory remedies the major problems 
of inflexibility due to the exclusive focus on categories that the Three Nos presented. By 
having a means tested mechanism the MLG would be open to everyone who fell within its 
definition of poor. In Pierson’s concept of feedback in policy choice the means test constitutes 
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a clear break with previous practice in spite of strong tendency toward familiar if ineffective 
mechanisms of providing social assistance (Pierson, 1994, 2004). 
This change in policy path highlights the alternatives which were considered. In its work 
report to Mayor Huang Ju in early 1993 the BCA suggested a continuation of category-based 
provisions. The BCA program would have catered to, for example, the elderly with family, 
and therefore potential caregivers, but with low incomes and no active caregiver by creating a 
special fund to distribute benefits. The policy suggested in the report, “View regarding 
resolving elderly residents in our city facing livelihood difficulties” (Guanyu jiejue benshi 
shiqu bufen laonianren shenghuo kunnande yijian) (Shi, 2002), would have resulted in a 
continuation of the Three Nos system in terms of administration and basic principles. This 
suggests two points; first, as seen in the local Civil Affairs policy proposal feedback from 
previous practice in the policy process was very strong. Second, once the decision to break 
from previous practice was made, the options opened up meant that a means-tested choice 
became viable. 
 
This pragmatic response to the problems created by the previous system extended into other 
areas of the design of the MLG. Responding to the problem of the Three Nos stagnation and 
inflexibility the MLG had some specific design features. The inclusion in the MLG of local 
funding and adjustment mechanisms which would respond to price changes reflected 
problems with the Three Nos subsidy. Actual subsidies available to Three Nos recipients 
stagnated due to the lack of funding increases and the lack of adjustment for subsidies during 
the reform period (Duoji, 2001a; Tang, 1998). The rejection of the preceding system 
influenced the choices available to policy makers in Shanghai. The same process which led to 
means testing also encouraged the introduction of local funding provisions and price related 
adjustment mechanisms. This meant that the MLG could be more responsive to economic 
development and price changes than its predecessor. 
 
This attempt to decisively break with the traditional Three Nos social assistance system can 
be explained by two factors. First, as noted the policy agenda and decision to reform social 
assistance was based on perceived failings in the traditional system. By choosing to introduce 
a locally based means tested program, the policy process arguably operated as it was intended 
to. Both Chinese officials and researchers commented on how the MLG carried design 
elements which responded to specific problems in the traditional system (Interviews TJ06-1, 
BJ07-1 and BJ07-3). Second, in interviews with Chinese researchers close to the Shanghai 
policy process, Mayor Huang Ju was highlighted as having a significant role in guiding 
design decisions. His comments at meetings and in reports were noted as a key part of the 
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MLG’s development and help explain the radical departure from the traditional system or a 
similar system as envisaged by the local Civil Affairs Bureau (Interviews TJ06-1 and BJ07-1). 
In the following two sections we will see further evidence of the dramatic impact actor 
interventions can have on policy outcomes on a much wider scale. 
 
Interestingly, the later version of the MLG which was implemented nationwide in 1997 did 
not include a financial or administrative role for enterprises. Changes during the expansion of 
the MLG reflected China's efforts to reform and extricate the social welfare system from the 
enterprises. The central government in the late 1990s did not want enterprises to continue 
providing social goods, and the move away from the work units in the 1997 Circular reflects 
this. MLG management became the responsibility of local government through newly 
established sub-districts, which are not officially part of the government but typically carry 
out work on behalf of the state (Derleth & Koldyk, 2004). In other areas such as pensions and 
health, pooling of resources and insurance were introduced in an effort to break reliance on 
enterprises (Duckett, 2001; Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a, 2004b). Wong also highlights this 
process in social welfare provisions, although in this case the basic level of administration 
was seen as a means to replace services rather than just administer new state measures (Wong, 
1998). This move away from reliance on enterprises in the MLG was therefore not an isolated 
move but reflects a new policy path by the Chinese state. 
 
In addition the emergence of the sub-districts as a new form of delivering local government 
neatly paralleled the corresponding move away from the work unit as the main unit of social 
control and policy provision in urban Chinese society. The process surrounding a particular 
policy is not a simple process and nor is it independent of changes in the wider political, 
social and economic environment. The changes to the MLG during nationwide expansion 
appear to be reflections of wider policy changes in China.  
 
National Implementation and actor intervention 
The structure of the state and policy feedback explains the initial emergence and design of the 
MLG but explaining the transition to national policy requires an understanding of the role 
played by policy actors. Although institutional features, especially the structure of the state, 
were significant in the transition of the MLG, it was the role of two policy actors that explains 
why the policy transitioned as it did. The change in the transition of the MLG from a stilted 
small-scale implementation to a national policy with the backing of China's legislative and 
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executive institutions reflects the different actors interested in the policy. Duoji Cairang was 
Minister of Civil Affairs from 1993 to 2003 overseeing the transition of the MLG from local 
to national policy. Duoji's support of the MLG was particularly influential from 1994 to 1996 
and saw the policy spread to a small number of cities throughout China. The interest taken by 
Li Peng, China's premier from 1993 to 1998, had a dramatic affect on the MLG and saw the 
policy move from the limited spread of Duoji Cairang's sponsorship to a call for national 
implementation and incorporation of the MLG into the state's long term policy plans. 
 
What characterizes Minister Duoji as a significant actor rather than a low profile policy actor? 
From 1994 to 1996 the MLG spread slowly to a small number of cities concentrated in the 
more developed areas of China and this is also the time period that Duoji Cairang was most 
visible and active as a supporter of the MLG in the documentary sources. Duoji was 
consistently cited in interviews with policy makers in China as being important to the spread 
of the MLG during this period supporting the idea he played a significant role as a support of 
the policy. During this period the MLG progressed through problem, agenda and 
implementation stages and Duoji was active throughout. 
 
Duoji was particularly active in meetings within the MCA giving speeches which justified the 
need for the MLG and exhorting cities to implement the MLG. This had the dual effect of 
keeping the MLG on the agenda whilst also pushing the implementation of the policy 
forward. The main challenge facing efforts to spread the MLG was the resistance of local 
governments who were being asked to adopt a policy with no financial help from the centre. 
There were four specific problems highlighted by Duoji facing the MLG between 1994 and 
1996. The first problem was that the MLG was perceived by some in the local Bureau of Civil 
Affairs (BCA) as not being the responsibility of the MCA. Second, the MLG was too much 
work and too troublesome to be a worthwhile investment of resources for local government 
and the BCA. Third, it was a new policy that had no guidelines, regulations and was 
unfamiliar. This is an interesting issue because typically policy, when announced, would come 
with a corresponding set of objectives and methods. In the case of the MLG this material was 
conspicuous by its absence until 1997. Finally, the policy was viewed as being inappropriate 
to certain areas in terms of their development (Duoji, 1998d). 
 
As a minister in a relatively resource-poor ministry Duoji was without the ability to find or 
allocate resources to support the implementation of the MLG. Instead Duoji had to rely on his 
personal political clout and ability to negotiate obstruction to the policy. Duoji's support of the 
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MLG was therefore characterized by justifications for implementing the MLG and countering 
objections to the policy. The arguments used by Duoji had three strands and appeared in many 
of his speeches on the subject. First, Duoji tied the MLG to three core aspects of the Party-
State’s policy aims at the time. The MLG was connected to the objective of ensuring 
continued social stability as it would counter unhappiness with the state that might emerge 
from impoverished households (Duoji, 1995b, 1998d). It was also presented as a policy which 
tied into the Party-State’s responsibilities to the urban poor and would therefore benefit all 
involved as it would encourage positive perceptions of the government (Duoji, 1998a, 1998d). 
Finally, the policy was tied to the continuation of the reform project by providing social 
stability and, therefore, was linked to arguably the core policy concept of the post-Mao era. 
The MLG was indicated as a policy that both guaranteed the continuation of the reform 
process and also an indication of China’s development. Using other countries social assistance 
policies as the basis, Duoji made the point that MLG-type policies were a global standard 
amongst developed nations and something that China should aspire to (Duoji, 1995b, 1998d). 
By configuring the debate surrounding the MLG in such a way Duoji ensured that resisting 
the MLG for whatever reason would be unlikely as it would be the equivalent of questioning 
core Party-State doctrine. 
 
Second, the arguments that the MLG was outside the responsibility of the MCA, the argument 
that the policy would create additional work and was too troublesome were countered 
together. This counter-argument was based around the previous MCA commitment to urban 
social assistance through the “Three Nos” policy. Essentially the MCA already had 
responsibility for the poorest and most vulnerable in China’s cities and the MLG was, 
therefore, not a extension of responsibility but a continuity. In addition, the MLG was 
presented as a reform of the Three Nos policy rather than a new policy in its own right (Duoji, 
1995b, 1998d). 
 
Third and finally, dealing with the developmental suitability of different localities a more 
practical compromise was established. Implementation was staggered nationally in order to 
allow under developed areas time to adapt to implementing the MLG. Focus was put on those 
cities seen as developed – predominantly on the Eastern Seaboard and the larger cities equal 
to provincial rank of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing (the zhixiashi level cities). 
Those cities labeled as under developed, mainly in the Central-West of the country, were 
permitted to follow later when circumstances would allow it (Duoji, 1995b, 1998c; Xi, 1998). 
 
 20 
There was no specific articulation of what motivated Minister Duoji to support the MLG out 
forward in either the documentary sources or during interviews. There are three possibilities 
which can be inferred from speeches given and the political situation in the PRC at the time. 
First, there is what has become one of the core justifications for the MLG, providing a means 
to ensure social stability by providing a minimum standard of life for the urban poor. This is a 
strong theme running through Duoji's speeches and politically it would have been a motivator 
for Chinese leaders in the years after Tiananmen. Second, a rational self interested approach 
would suggest that Duoji was seeking to strengthen the MCA through adopting a new policy.  
In retrospect drawing such a conclusion is tempting but I would caution against it. Although 
the MLG has gone on to become a prestige policy which attracts central budget allocations 
this was not the case in the early to mid 1990s. It could be viewed as having been the reverse 
given the policy relied on local compliance and financing. What Duoji was pushing for, 
implementation of a policy with no resources to support it, would have made compliance 
extremely problematic. As Frazier notes when discussing pension reform by the central 
government, even when it has significant political authority, cannot expect compliance when 
it announces “unfunded mandates” (Frazier, 2004b).  Finally, there is a strong ideological 
theme in the speeches of Duoji where justification for the MLG is tied to the Communist 
system. The MLG was put forward as a means to demonstrate the state’s care for the people 
(Duoji, 1998d) and establish a policy that would reflect well on the Chinese reform project in 
an international setting (Duoji, 1995b). The MLG presented here is a tool which strengthens 
the legitimacy of the status quo and supports the people. Politically Duoji presents the MLG 
as an almost perfect policy for the Communist Party. 
 
Duoji was acting from a constrained position and this had a significant impact on the 
development of the MLG. The position of Minister confers significant political power over 
policy in a particular area but is also limited by the resources available to that particular 
ministry. In the case of Duoji this meant his options for supporting the MLG were limited 
because of the relatively poor resources available to the MCA (Linda Wong, 1998). As a 
minister, Duoji was unable to order local government to implement the MLG and could not 
divert resources to offer an incentive to carry out the program. This meant that when trying to 
promote the MLG Duoji had to rely on tailoring the policy to suit local government and 
persuade them to adopt the policy; this led to a relatively small scale level of implementation 
toward the end of 1995. The other major outcome of this sponsorship was an uneven national 
implementation and some local variations in financing and coverage within the core concept 
of the MLG policy. Variations were allowed, provided the core concept of a means-tested, 
locally administered and funded measure to provide subsistence subsidies to the urban poor 
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was followed. This can be put down to the fairly relaxed response to concerns over a lack of 
regulations. This in combination with the specifics of local circumstances led to variations 
emerging in the MLG in different parts of the PRC. Duoji’s institutional position therefore 
meant his support of the MLG had a number of unintended outcomes. 
 
The support of Li Peng becomes apparent in documentary sources from 1996 and in 
interviews with Chinese policymakers where Li was identified as being fundamentally 
important to the development of the MLG. Premier Li backed the MLG as early as 1994 at the 
same conference that Duoji suggested the policy should be implemented nationally, but it was 
in 1996 that his influence became significant. At this point the MLG had spread to a small 
number of cities but was still significantly short of national implementation. During 1996 the 
MLG was made part of the 9
th
 Five Year Plan (1996-2000) and the 2010 Long Term 
Development Goals (NPC, 1998). In addition there was a noticeable increase in the number of 
cities implementing the policy. In 1997 the national implementation of the MLG was 
announced and specific details of how the policy was to be implemented were detailed in the 
“State Council Circular Regarding Establishing a National Urban Resident MLG System” 
(State-Council, 1997). It was during these developments that Premier Li sponsored the MLG 
and pushed the policy beyond the difficult position it had been in up until this point. 
 
The tools used by Premier Li to support the MLG were much the same as those used by Duoji 
Cairang. Speeches given on the MLG (Duoji, 1998c; P. Li, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c) and 
comments recorded in meetings (Duoji, 1998c; P. Li, 1998a) promoted the MLG to central 
and local government. In addition the use of legislative institutions as noted above (P. Li, 
1998a, 1998b; MCA, 1998; NPC, 1998) and the agreement and publication of the 1997 
Circular regarding the MLG (State Council, 1997) pushed a change in focus regarding the 
MLG. The decision to implement the MLG nationally was made during a routine meeting of 
the State Council before August 1997 cited by Minister Duoji in an editorial for the People’s 
Daily (Duoji, 1998e). Premier Li was associated with the MLG and took action on the policy 
before this meeting took place, whereas in the case of other elite leaders such as General 
Secretary Jiang Zemin the only documented speech on the policy was after the meeting 
(Jiang, 1998). 
 
As with the case of Duoji Cairang Li’s motives are very difficult to determine beyond making 
inferences. There are four possible reasons why the elite leadership might have swung behind 
the MLG at this particular time. First, Li Peng had expressed his support for reform of the 
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social assistance system and the MLG from as early as 1994 (P. Li, 1995). Premier Li 
received reports on the policy (Interview BJ06-2) and at certain points did take an active hand 
demanding further implementation (Duoji, 1998c). Second, the policy success was being 
reported up the bureaucracy through research reports and work meetings held by the MCA. In 
addition the MCA was actively reporting on the MLG as part of its routine responsibilities to 
the State Council. Premier Li was specifically mentioned by MCA officials as having 
responded favorably to these reports (Interviews BJ06-2; TJ06-1 and BJ07-1). This meant that 
the elites would have been aware of a successful policy and receiving regular information on 
it. Third, a departmental head in the MCA reported that the State Council was encouraged by 
the Ministry already working towards some means to ensure national implementation 
(Interview BJ07-3). This would suggest that it was not only on the agenda being put to elite 
leaders but that in terms of implementation there was already a ministry fully supporting the 
policy and a certain amount of the required work already done.  
 
Finally, 1996 saw the proposal of further reforms to the state-owned enterprise sector and 
increased concerns over the possible impact on social stability that further reform might have. 
Concerns were especially focused on laid-off workers
4
, as well as those affected by losing 
welfare benefits and pensions because their former work unit was struggling with market 
conditions (Interviews Grp1BJ06; BJ07-1; and BJ07-3). The threat of an unstable society 
brought about by the reforms would have resonated with the leadership of 1997 as it echoed 
those of 1989 in many ways. This concern with the social welfare impacts of reforms was 
reflected in the reform and experimentation in other areas of the social security system, for 
example, in pensions, health insurance, and unemployment. Without this concern to contain 
current problems and pre-empt future instability the MLG would likely not have made it onto 
the national agenda. Once it was there, however, the additional factors noted would have 
come into play to further support its case for a rapid, State Council supported national 
implementation. 
 
The support of the MLG between 1994 and 1997 by Duoji and Li highlights a number of 
issues that need to be considered when explaining the development of a policy. Of particular 
note is that the institutional position a policy actor occupies will have a significant impact on 
                                                 
4
 “Laid-off” workers refers to those former employees of state-owned enterprises who were not formally 
unemployed but at the same time no longer worked for their enterprises. Instead they continued to have some 
formal ties to their enterprise, for example through welfare provisions and received a special benefit from the 
government called the Laid-off Worker Basic Living Guarantee. The decision to lay off workers was seen as a 
means to cushion the blow of rationalizing China’s large state owned sector in the late 1990s. The alternative 
would have been to make this large number of workers unemployed which would have been a significant political 
risk. For more on laid-off workers (Cai, 2006). 
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the development of a policy. This is because the actor’s position influences what resources 
and institutions they will have access to. This is hinted at in the fragmented authoritarianism 
model, although Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s argument, focused on US bureaucrats, implies 
that there are always resources to be bargained over when deciding and implementing policy 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). This case highlights the impact that a lack of resources can 
have as well as the opposite. Although Minister Duoji actively sought the national adoption of 
the MLG, his politically and financially limited position meant that he was only able to make 
limited progress towards this goal. In comparison, Premier Li was able to use his access and 
influence over China's legislative and executive institutions to ensure that the MLG was 
adopted and this ultimately produced the 1997 State Council circular and the support of the 
country’s top leaders. This section also highlights the unintended outcomes that sponsorship 
can have. In the case of Duoji's sponsorship of the MLG the compromised position he 
occupied meant that the policy spread sporadically and was not implemented in a consistent 
manner. When seeking to explain the development of a policy we should not focus entirely on 
motivations because these can only partly explain what the actual outcomes might be. In the 
case of Duoji and Li Peng the institutional position occupied by these individual policy actors 
profoundly influenced how they were able to support the MLG but also the outcome of this 
support. 
 
Explaining national expansion of the MLG through actor intervention 
The final point in the development of the MLG that this article will discuss is the significant 
expansion of the MLG between 2000 and 2002. The expansion of the MLG is in large part 
due to the influence of Zhu Rongji, China's Premier from 1998 to 2003. Following a visit to 
the city of Dalian in Liaoning Province in April 2000, Zhu announced that the MLG was an 
example of how China's social welfare should be delivered through the community rather than 
tied to enterprises (Tang, 2003). This comment was the result of problems in delivering 
welfare to workers who had been laid off by their enterprises. Payments destined for these 
workers, a temporary measure designed to absorb any protest that might result from the shock 
of becoming effectively unemployed, had instead been absorbed by cash-strapped enterprises 
to pay for other commitments. This problem was labeled “debt conflict”; the lack of such a 
conflict in the MLG which made it attractive to Zhu as a means to resolve the problem of 
delivering some form of subsidy to laid-off workers (Interviews BJ07-1; BJ07-2; and BJ07-
3). In the case of Zhu and the expansion of the MLG the motivations for why action was 
taken are very clear. 
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This focus on laid-off workers saw the release and guarantee of funds from the central budget 
from 2000 onward; this required a considerable amount of political authority given that 
agreement would be required from the State Council as well as compliance from the Ministry 
of Finance. In addition the money would need to be found from somewhere, which implies a 
degree of oversight and authority. 
 
Premier Zhu was responsible for pushing the idea of using the MLG to resolve the laid-off 
worker problem and releasing the required funding, although exactly how he went about 
doing this is not particularly clear. The information available from interviews implies that 
Zhu's support of the MLG occurred very much from above. Funds were released with specific 
orders attached leaving others with administrative roles, the MCA in this case, to get on with 
implementation. Zhu did continue to show an interest in the development of the Yingbao 
Jinbao throughout the period with communication and meetings between Zhu and the 
Minister of Civil Affairs and the MCA Department for Natural Disaster Relief and Social 
Assistance (Jiuzai Jiuji) (Interview BJ07-3). Apart from the initial visit to Dalian which kick-
started the campaign, Zhu did not take a particularly visible public role, only appearing to 
deliver speeches being given at large scale Civil Affairs events (X. Li, 2002) or at meetings of 
involved participants (Li & Zhu, 2000). 
 
Zhu’s support of the MLG shares similarities with that of Duoji and Li. His motivation was a 
mixture of the political and personal, leading to a sustained interest in a policy over a period 
of time. Zhu’s interest also highlights the significant impact that a policy actor from the elite 
tiers of government can have in China. The direction of massive financial resources and 
guarantee of continued support mean that the expansion of the MLG by 10 million recipients 
was accomplished within a few years. Zhu also highlights the role a sponsor plays, straddling 
multiple stages of a policy development as he set the agenda, was the decision-maker, and 
was subsequently active throughout the implementation of the campaign to expand the MLG. 
 
Addressing Local Government as an Actor 
Local government has a significant role to play in both the development and also in the 
implementation of a new policy. Studies of pension and healthcare reform have highlighted 
the importance of local government (Duckett, 2001; Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a, 2004b); so 
it is in the case of the MLG.  
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Although it is difficult to generalize about as broad a collection of different actors as “local 
government”, there are a two points that can be made. Typically local government can be seen 
to have a dual role when it comes to the development and implementation of new policy 
measures. By taking advantage of space in China’s fragmented political system, local 
government can introduce new policy and support the wider adoption of particular programs. 
This positive role was clearly played by the Shanghai government when it developed and 
implemented the MLG in the early 1990s. In addition, the early spread of the MLG, although 
supported and pushed by Duoji Cairang, can be seen as a limited success only because of 
local government adopting the measure in the period before 1997. In contrast, this space also 
provides local government the opportunity to obstruct and misinterpret policy. The MLG was 
particularly susceptible to this negative role during the early period of its development when 
Duoji struggled to overcome local government intransigence to adopting a policy with no 
resource support. Only the intervention of the elite with significant political authority and 
access to resources, in this case Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, was this problem resolved although 
this ultimately came at the cost of the local character of the MLG. 
 
There are two observations which can be made based on the experience of the MLG and local 
government. First, local government has its own agenda, which needs to be viewed as 
separate from both individual elite leaders and the needs of particular bureaucratic 
organizations. Second, the problem of “unfunded mandates” in the implementation of social 
policy in China is significant (Frazier, 2004b). These observations support the conclusions 
drawn by other studies of social policy reform in China (Béland & Yu, 2004; Duckett, 2001; 
Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a, 2004b). In the case of the MLG the problem of local 
implementation was only satisfactorily resolved when the laid-off worker problem was 
reaching a critical point for local government and Premier Zhu’s intervention saw a 
significant commitment to immediate and future funding. 
 
Conclusion 
The emergence and eventual implementation of the MLG marked a significant change in the 
objectives and delivery of urban social assistance in the PRC. Whilst this has been reflected in 
a large number of studies on China's social assistance, actual explanation for the MLG's 
emergence and subsequent development has been lacking. The current literature, with the 
exception of Solinger (2005), focuses on the efficacy of the program. This article has sought 
to provide an explanation for the emergence and development of the MLG during the period 
1993 to 2002. In this article four particular aspects of the emergence and implementation of 
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the MLG were identified and discussed in order to help explain the development of China's 
urban social assistance reform. These were why the policy emerged in Shanghai; why the 
MLG was designed in the way it was; why the transition from local to national policy had the 
character it did; and finally why the policy expanded after 2000.  
 
The early emergence and development of the MLG highlights in particular the importance of 
understanding institutional elements when explaining policy in the PRC. The emergence of 
the MLG in Shanghai highlights the important role that the structure of the state can play in 
creating the space and setting for new policy to emerge. Decentralization in China allows 
local government the space to innovate on policy problems and this can lead to the emergence 
of policy innovations. In the early 1990s Shanghai was facing the dual challenge of reforms: 
the city was benefitting in terms of revenue from a growing economy but the local 
government also realized that pending enterprise reforms and increases in the cost of living 
meant that social instability was a real possibility. Taking advantage of the space and fiscal 
strength decentralization provided, Shanghai was able to introduce the MLG. The traditional 
social assistance system  was also significant during this period influencing the agenda and 
choices for policymakers. The failings of the traditional social assistance system helped set 
the agenda because the existing system could not cope with the rapid changes reform was 
bringing. In the design of the MLG there was a dual influence. On the one hand the MLG 
reflected feedback in highlighting the traditional targets of social assistance even though this 
was not a necessary design requirement. In addition the use of traditional but problematic 
administrative units, in this case the work units, also reflected the influence of previous long 
standing practice. On the other hand the introduction of means testing, local financing, and 
locally set and adjusted benefits reflected the choice by policy makers to follow a different 
path than that of the traditional system. 
 
The final factor highlighted in explaining the MLG is the role of actors who took an active 
interest in promoting and supporting the policy. The important point to note here is not just 
that particular actors decide to support a policy but what position in the political system they 
occupy. This was hinted at when highlighting the role of Mayor Huang Ju in the emergence of 
the Shanghai model of the MLG. Duoji Cairang’s support from the early 1990s and beyond 
helps explain the gradual transition of the MLG from local to national policy. The 
compromised position Duoji occupied as minister of a resource-poor ministry helps us 
understand why the initial transition of the MLG was slow, geographically uneven, and 
subject to policy variation, as he was unable to use binding orders or resources to support his 
 27 
position. Similar to Frazier’s observations in pension reform, making unfunded demands of 
local government does not result in successful implementation (Frazier, 2004b). In contrast, 
the support of Li Peng had a significant impact on the MLG from 1996 onwards, in 
overseeing the establishing of central support of the policy, the incorporation of the MLG into 
national policy planning, and ultimately the national implementation of the policy. Finally, the 
influence of Zhu Rongji as a supporter of the MLG from 2000 to 2002 helps explain the 
sudden and significant expansion of the MLG in both number of recipients and the amount 
spent on the policy. In both the latter cases of Li and Zhu the elite position occupied by these 
sponsors helps explain the significant legislative, executive and financial support directed at 
the policy. 
 
These contributions support the findings of policy studies which have addressed other social 
policy reforms in China (Béland & Yu, 2004; Duckett, 2001; Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a, 
2004b; Solinger, 2005). There are two final points to make; first, the case of the MLG 
suggests that the use of institutions is a useful conceptual tool to use in conjunction with our 
current understanding of the bureaucracy in the PRC building on the work of Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988). Who makes decisions is important but it is also important to consider 
where they make those decisions from. Second, it supports the synthesis approach highlighted 
in a number of policy studies publications. As Béland and Yu (2004) suggest we should not 
discuss policy developments with institutions and actors separately because they are tied 
together as part of a single, messy, process.  
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